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and market  prices  coexist  - as happens  in  mixed  system  of controlled  and market prices.
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ence in Hungary  and Poland with price reform.  responsive  to macroeconomic  imbalances  can
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They analyze  the macroeconomic  implica-  reducing  the wedge  between  controlled  and free
tions of adopting  different  price rules for adjust-  prices  stabilizes  the system.
ing controlled  prices  - and discuss  the implica-
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the slow adjustment  of controlled  prices  can
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1. Introduction
The relaxation  of price  controls  has  been  a consistent  feature  of reform
in socialist  economies. At the  same  time,  there  appears  to  have  been a strong
positive  association  between  such  price  reforms  and increases  in the  rate  of
inflation. It is  widely  held that  this  association  merely  reflects  the
translation  of hidden  or repressed  into  open inflation.  However,  as Table  1
clearly  indicates,  those  countries  - Hungary,  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  - that
have  undertaken  significant  price  reforms  have  maintained  such  higher  levels
of inflation. Indeed,  price  reforms  appear  to  be linked  to  progressively  more
powerful  inflationary  outcomes  that  can  culminate  in  hyperinflation,  as  has
happened  in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia.
Table  1
:nflation  in  Eastern  Europe,  industriat  Countries nd  bet  loping  Ccuntries,  1971-89
Average
1971-80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
BuLgaria  2.0  0.4  0.3  1.4  0.7  1.7  3.5  0.0  *0.1  n.a.
Czechoslovakia  1.1  0.9  4.7  1.1  0.9  1.3  0.4  0.1  0.2  n.a.
GDR  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.a.
Romauia  0.9  2.0  16.9  5.2  1.1  0.4  -0.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Soviet  Union  0.3  1.0  3.0  1.0  -1.0  1.0  2.0  1.9  n.a.  n.a.
Hungary  4.5  4.6  6.9  7.3  8.3  7.0  5.3  8.6  15.7  16.0(*)
Poland  4.6  24.4  101.5  23.0  15.7  14.4  18.0  25.2  60.0  244.0
Industrial
countries  8.6  10.1  7.5  5.0  4.9  4.1  2.4  3.0  3.3  4.5
Developing
countries  20.6  25.8  25.4  32.7  38.5  40.6  31.4  41.6  70.8  85.5
Source:  UN,  Economic  Survey  of  Europe  1988-89;  IMF,  World  Economic Outlook,  October  1989
(*)  First  three  quarters  for  19892
One  emerging  judgentent  is that  partial  price  reforms  can  promote  price
disturbances  which  when linked  to  volatile  expectations  can  result  in a  price
spiral. The  underlying  argument  can  be derived  from  the  nature  and  scale  of
the  a)zolute  and  relative  price  distortions  present  in  &  typical  socialist
economy. This  argument  can  be taken  in  a  number  of directions.  On the  one
hand,  the  additive  nature  of the  disturbances  induced  by each  bout of  price
adjustments  can  be an argument  for  a once-and-for-all  price  liberalization  of
the  type  undertaken  in Poland  in  January  1990. In this  light,  and  assuming
the  fundamentals  are  in  order,  one  transmission  path  for  inflation  would  be
eliminated  as  both the  price  level  and  relative  prices  would  be established  by
importing  international  prices  (Lipton  and  Sachs,1990).  This ignores,  however,
non-tradables  prices  as well  as the  fact  that  price  inertia  and  stickiness
also  characterize  market  systems. Further,  the  institutional  and  behavioural
rules  operating  in the  economy  may continue  to  prejudice  a rapid  or efficient
settling  down  of  prices. Among  other  factors,  as long  as state-owned
enterprises  continue  to  account  for  the  largest  share  of industrial  sector
output,  even  a full  price  liberalization  will  not  eradicate  administrative
interference  in  price  setting. The  question  of political  feasibility  is  also
central. Accordingly,  more  gradualistic  approaches  to  price  reform  are  likely
to remain  important. Further,  as this  paper  indicates,  a gradualistic
approach  need  not  yield  a price  explosion  but  can,  under  certain  conditions,
be used  to dampen  p_ice  volatility  and  the  tendency  to rapid  inflation.
The  gradual  approach  to  a full  market-based  system  of prices  implies  the
continuing  coexistence  of categories  of  prices  with differing  procedures  for
determination.  Generally  speaking,  this  involves  two  main sets  of prices;  one
administratively  set  by the  government  or  planner;  the  other  set,  in3
principle,  in  the  markct  place. In reality,  the  distinction  is  less  strict.
Indeed,  cost-plus  pricing,  market-clearing  and  fully  arbitrary  administrative
pricing  rules  Pan  all  be simultaneously  present  in a  partially  reformed
socialist  economy  (Kornai,1980).  In this  paper,  for  the  sake  of simplicity,
we  work  with a dual  pricing  system  where  one  set  of  prices  is  determined  by
markets,  the  other  administratively.  It  should  be noted  that  we do  not
identify  market  prices  with  fully  flexible  prices  and  hence  assume  the
presence  of inertial  features. Our  aim is  to set  up a relatively  simple  model
capable  of  handling  the  particular  price-price  dynamics  that  are  associated
with a dual  pricing  system  where  disturbances  can  be introduced  on  both sides
but primarily  by changes  to administered  prices  and,  hence,  where  the  discrete
choices  of the  planner  are  critical. The  objective  is to  clarify  analytically
the  conditions  under  which  this  system  can  be stabilized  and  which  would
therefore  be relevant  when the  general  approach  to  price  reform  is
gradualistic.  Moreover,  because  our  concerns  are  macroeconomic,  the
implications  of price  changes  and  relative  price  movements  are  traced  in
relation  to  effective  demand  and the  budgetary  position. Nothing  is said
about  the  allocative  consequences  of such  price  movements.  However,  it is
worth  noting  that  high inflation  on the  aggregate  level  generally  undermines
the  possibility  of efficient  changes  in relative  prices.
To pursue  this  line  of enquiry,  a number  of  underlying  rules  have to  be
spelt  out.  One  would  wish to  know the  rules  by which  controlled  and  market
prices  were  respectively  set  prior  to  determining  the  interactive  effects
between  controlled  and  market  prices. An underlying  rule  would  also  include
the  relative  role  attributed  to the  adjustment  of  controlled  prices  by the
government  or planner,  as against  other  instruments,  in  achieving4
macroeconomic  targets,  such  as the  planned  supply  function  2,  It is  clearly
reasonable  to assume  that  the  planner  can  use  controlled  prices  as a  major
macroeconomic  policy  instrument  even  if the  economy  is increasingly  marked  by
the  presence  of  non-administered,  market-set  pr'.ces.  With  respect  to the
latter,  one  must  obviously  assume  similar  features  to  market  economies  -
inertia  in  price  adjustment,  staggered  price  setting  rules  not  to speak  of the
consequences  of relatively  thin  markets,  speculative  pressures  and  constrained
trades.
The  paper  emphasizes  the  fiscal  underpinnings  of the  inflationary  process
and  those  particular  dynamics  wher  a dual  price  system  is  present. In
particular,  we explore  the  links  between  price  controls  and  decontrols  and the
government  budget,  mainly  through  the  flow  of subsidies  to  either  consumers  or
producers.  A clear  conclusion  is  that  without  consistency  in  macroeconomic
policy,  price  liberalization  may simply  exacerbate  imbalances  and  ultimately
provide  a  mechanism  for  sustaining  inflation,  hence  compromising  a basic
objective  of  macroeconomic  policy.
With  regard  to the  underlying  rule  for  the  adjustment  of controlled
prices,  we assume  that  this  occurs  in  response  to  macro-imbalances,
particularly  as partial  corrections  to disequilibria  in  consumer  goods
markets. Likewise,  we can  assume  that  over  time  planners  do  not remain
indifferent  to the  size  of the  wedge  between  border  and  domestic  prices  for
strategic  tradables,  such  as energy,  particularly  because  of the  fiscal
implications  of such  a  wedge.  At a certain  point,  adjustment  of controlled
2  Available  work  has concentrated  primarily  on  quantity  adjustments
where  prices  are  fixed.  The  gap  between  planned  and  actual  consumption  by
households  is  fed  back into  supply  equation;  hence  plan formation  is
endogenous. See,  for  example,  Portes,  Quandt,  Winter  and  Yeo (1983).5
prices  may  occur  to  close  the  wedge.
This  points  not  only  to one  of the  basic  choices  of the  planner  --  either
to adjust  those  set  of prices  which  are  controlled  or else  rely  on fiscal-
monetary  instruments  --  but also  to the  way in  which  these  instruments
interact  and  to the  ambiguous  outcomes  that  can  be derived  within  the
constraints  of the  socialist  econouy. Thus,  reducing  a price  wedge  for
energy,  say,  may  result  in lower  levels  of subsidy  passed  through  the  budget.
If,  however,  changes  to the  input  costs  of enterprises  occur  but output  prices
remain  controlled  and  no strong  productivity  effect  is  present,  this  may
simply  increase  the  losses  of  enterprises  and  ultimately  the  fiscal  or quasi-
fiscal  deficit. This  appears  to  have  occurred  in  both  Poland  and  Yugoslavia
in recent  years. Alternatively,  if  changes  to input  prices  are  transmitted
immediately  via normal  cost  pricing  rules  through  to  final  prices,  an
inflationary  outcome  is  inevitable.  These  mechanisms  are  confirr  u  by the
experience  of Poland  after  1990,  whereby  controlled  input  prices  --  mainly
energy  --  were sharply  raised  in  a context  where  final  prices  were almost
fully  liberalized.  This  led  to an improvement  in the  budget  deficit,  via  a
reduction  in  subsidies,  but  also  provoked  an initial  boost  to inflation.
The interactive  effects  of price  changes  to  controlled  and  market  prices
further  depends  on the  character  of the  dual  system  with  which  we are  working.
One such  system  assumes  a  process  of  horizontal  price  liberalization.  Under
such  a mixed  system,  two  sets  of prices  exist  for  the  same  commodity.
Alternatively,  a  vertical  liberalization  would  result  in some  sets  of prices,
such  as for  final  goods,  being  controlled  and  others,  such  as intermediates,
being  set  in  markets. The  nature  of the  mixed  system  can  be further  modified
to incorporate  official  and  black  market  sectors  but  the  real  issue  is  not the6
status  of the  sector  but the  pricing  rule  that  is imposed  3.  However,  the
nature  of the  price  liberalization  pursued  has implications  for  the  manner  in
which  the  planner  can  use prices  as a  macroeccnomic  instrument  '.
The  model  that  we set  up  below  does  not  explicitly  discriminate  between
types  of  mixed  system  other  than  in  working  with two  distinct  pricing  rules.
The  price  level  and inflation  rate  are  derived  as  a weighted  average. The two
pricing  regimes  - that  established  by the  planner  and  that  by the  market  -
are,  however,  characterized  by non-synchronization  and  by different  underlying
rules  and  constraints. Our  principal  interest  is in  demonstrating  the  ways in
which  changes  in  the  rules  for  price  adjustments  of controlled  prices  by the
planner  can  affect  the  overall  inflation  rate.  To do this,  we make a  number
of  key assumptions.
In the  first  instance,  the  planner's  rule  for  controlled  price  changes
remains  influenced,  if  not  determined,  by the  constraints  present  prior  to  any
price  reform.  Adjustment  to controlled  prices  to act  on demand  can  be
considered  an explicit  policy  choice.  Alternatively,  the  planners  can  decide
to  adjust  controlled  prices  in line  with  changes  in  market  prices.  This
behavior  tends  to stabilize  the  economy.  However,  for  many  products  there  are
no domestic  market  prices  to imitate. In these  cases  foreign  prices  of
similar  products  may  be assumed  as reference  price  for  adjusting  controlled
3  See, for  example,  Alexeev  (1987). Gronicki's  (1989)  disequilibrium
model  employs  a  mixed  system  but assumes  controlled  prices  to  be fixed  and.
free  prices  to  be fully  flexible. The  latter  assumption  is  obviously
inappropriate  in the  context  of a transitional  socialist  economy  as it
overstates  the  equilibrating  power  of  market  based  prices.
'  Horizontal  systems  can  either  have  cont  olled  and  market  prices  for  the
same  good --  as in  China  --  or else  no coexistence  for  similar  or
substitutable  goods,  as in  much of Eastern  Europe.7
prices.'  A less  efficient  rule,  but  perhaps  still  stabilizing  at the  macro
level,  could  assume  the  average  price  index  in the  econoy as  reference  point.
Second,  market  prices  are  not  assumed  to  be fully  flexible  prices,  having
rather  some  of the  properties  of the  price  system  that  actually  prevails  in
market  economies,  including  '.nertia  and  stickiness,  but in a  more exaggerated
form. This  would  be expected  in  a transitional  regime  where  competitive
conditions  are  either  absent  or restricted.  Our treatment  of this  environment
--  a standard  feature  of the  reforming  socialist  economy  --  draws  on some  of
the  characteristics  of  price  setting  that  can  be derived  under  monopolistic
competition  (Chamberlin,  1933). This in  turn  may actually  exaggerate  the
degree  of similarity  between  such  economies  and  a  market  system. This is
because  monopolistic  competition  assumes  free  entry  of firms  and  products  6.
We impose  long-run  equilibrium  conditions  on the  system,  while  prices  cannot
instantaneously  eliminate  macro-disequilibria.  The  main  results  that  we derive
can  be summarized  as follows;
(i)  if the  planner  becomes  too  responsive  to  macro-imbalances  in
adjusting  controllei  prices,  this  can  destabilize  r1he system,
(ii) if the  planner  gives  a large  weight  to reducing  the  wedge  between
controlled  and  free  prices,  this  stabilizes  the  system,
(iii)  while  the  overshoot,ng  on impact  of the  equilibrium  inflation  rate
5Interestingly,  Kornai(1990)  has  recently  suggested  similar  rules  for
adjusting  prices  of public  enterprises  during  the  transition  to a  market
economy.
°  It  might  be more  appropriate  to think  in terms  of overlapping
oligopolies,  in the  spirit  of  Kaldor(1935).  This  has obvious  implications  for
establishing  whether  Cournot-Nash  conditions  hold.  In this  context,  we are
not interested  in the  efficiency  or  optimality  conditions  but in  establishing
a pricing  rule  that  does  not  require  market  clearing  but  has  broadly  flexible
properties.8
is  a general  outcome,  the  overshooting  is larger  the  more frequent  are  the
adjustments  to controlled  prices  by the  planner,
(iv)  raising  the  share  of  market  prices  in total  prices  has a stabilizing
effect  in  the  long  run  with,  however,  a larger  overshooting  .n  the  short  run,
(v)  forward-looking  behaviour  on the  part  of  price-setters  is  conducive
to  stability  whoreas  similar  behaviour  on the  part of  consumers  may  be
destabilizing,
(vi)  the  more sensitive  aggregate  demand  is to  expected  inflation,  the
larger  will  be the  initiul  overshooting,  while  the  greater  w4.l1  be the  risk  of
overall  instability,
(vii) a  complete  price  liberalization  is clearly  superior  to a  mixed
system  in terms  of stability  but is  likely  to  be associated  with a  very
substantial  initial  overshooting  of the  equilibrium  inflation  rate.
The structure  of the  paper  is  as follows. In the  following  section  we
provide  a summary  discussion  of the  main  features  of the  mixed  price  economy.
In section  3  we lay  out  the  main features  of the  formal  model  (the  Appendix
contains  a full  specification)  and  in  section  4 we derive  the  main
conclusions.
2.  Some  stylized  features  of the  dual  price  economy
To provide  an empirical  framework  against  which  Lo-  set  the  workings  of
the  model  that  we develop  in  Section  3,  we draw  on information  for  two
economies  --  Hungary  and  Poland. Analegous  considerations  would,  however,
apply  to  most reforming  socialist  economies.  In the  case  of Hungary  and
Poland,  both  economies  have  undergone  a sustained  period  of relaxation  of
controls  but this  process  has  been  associated  with  very  differing  inflationary
outcomes  (see  Table  1).  Further,  since  1990,  the  Polish  stabilization9
strategy  has  marked  a radical  break  with  past  practice. To that  extent,  the
Polish  experience  enccmpasses  both a  period  in  which  a  mixed  pricing  system
operated  and  one in  which  this  distinction  was dissolved  as part  of a fuller
?rice  liberalization  that  left  barely  5%  of retail  prices  subject  to any  form
of control. For  both countries,  a  mixed  pricing  system  did  not  generally
imply  polar  cases,  in  so far  as market  prices  were  generally  subject  to some
lesser  measure  of intervention  through  establishment  of ceilings  on price
changes  and  control  over  the  frequency  of  price  adjustment.  While  rather  more
binding  than  in industrial  market  economies,  such  interventions  bear
similarity  to  periods  when prices  and  incomes  policies  have  been deployed,
such  as in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  1960s  and  the  United  States  in  the  early
19709. The  difference,  of course,  remains  the  extent  of intervention,  the
rules  for  enforcing  that  intervention  and  the  presence  of fully  controlled
prices  as a commonly  dominant  component  of the  overall  system.
The  Hungarian  experience  with  a gradual  liberalization  of prices  reflects
the  relatively  early  recognition  of the  need to  provide  adequate  incentives  to
producers  in  markets  where  official  controls  were  weak,  such  as agriculture,
as  well es the  intention  to  relate  more  closely  domestic  to  border  prices.
Since  1968,  when the  price  liberalization  commenced  7,  emphasis  has shifted
from  acting  on  producer  prices  to direct  adjustment  of consumer  prices.
However,  the  response  to  external  price  shocks  has  been inconsistent;  the
first  oil  price  shock  of 1973  was  offset  by subsidies,  controls  and  exchange
'  Through  those  reforms  a three-tier  system  was  established  consisting  of
fixed  prices,  flexible  prices  - with  fluctuations  permitted  between  a
designated  ceiling  and floor  - and  free  prices  that  enterprises  were  allowed
to set  within  a set  of established  guidelines  and  were in reality  also
strongly  regulated-.  There  were in addition  prices  set  in  non-official  markets
but  these  accotnted  for  a very  small  share  of total  transact.ons.10
rate  appreciation;  a reflection  of the  planner's  preoccupation  with stability
of  official  prices. Subsequent  policy  has  generally  enabled  a  more direct
translation  of external  price  changes  through  to domestic  producer  prices
After  1980  producer  prices  were  more  explicitly  related  to  world  prices
through  cnergy  and  raw  materials  prices. The  effect  on consumer  prices  has in
turn  depended  on the  degree  to  which  enterprises  nave  been  allowed  to  pass  on
such  price  increases. The  competitive  pricing  system  that  was  established  and
operated  up to 1987  linked  domestic  price  adjustments  and  profit  margins  to
export  prices  and  profit  margins. Later  modifications  to  the  pricing  rules,
particularly  after  1985,  have  progressively  reduced  the  share  of  prices
subject  to controls. Price  controls  have  been  maintained  on  housing.
Table  2 indicates  the  sharp  increase  in the  share  of free  prices  for  both
producer  and  consumer  goods  over the  last  decade. By 1989  77%  of producer  and
83%  of consumer  prices  were  classified  as free. For  consumer  prices,  explicit
price  controls,  with  prices  constrained  to  a maximum,  were  almost  entirely
concentrated  on domestic  energy,  medicine  and transportation.  These  controls
are  in theory  to  be further  scaled  down  over  the  coming  five  years. In the
case  of the  free  prices,  however,  roughly  20%  remained  subject  to either  an
obligation  to  report  in  advance  price  changes  or else  to the  price
consultation  process. These  mechanisms  have  attempted  to  correct  for  any
inherent  tendency  to exploit  market  power  in  highly  concentrated  markets.
8  This  has  not  been  that  consistent-  the  effects  of the  1986  devaluation
on  domestic  prices  were restrained  by administrative  actions.11
Table  2: Hungary
Distribution  of Producer  and  Consumer  Prices  by Pricing  Category,  1979-1989
Category  1979  1980  1982  1984  1985  1987  1988  1989
Producer:
Fixed  43  33  na  30  32  28  25  23
Free  57  67  na  70  68  72  75  77
Consumer:
Fixed  na  na  15  15  6  6  0  0
Flexible  na  na  29  28  38  32  20  17
Free  na  na  56  57  56  62  80  83
Source:  IMF
l/Producer  fixed  prices  include  fixed  prices,  prices  fluctuating  between  fixed
upper  and  lower  limits  and  those  subject  to  a maximum.  Consumer  flexible
prices  include  prices  subject  to  a maximum.
The  principal  features  of the  Hungarian  experience  can  be summarized  in
the  following  way.  The  price  system  has  been  mixed  with  up to four  sets  of
pricing  rules  coexisting  at  any  one  time,  being  differentiated  by the  extent
of administrative  control  over  their  determination.  The  relative  price
structure  has  not  been as frozen  as in  a  number  of other  Eastern  European
economies  due to  explicit  changes  to  relative  prices  by the  planner,  by the
linking  of foreign  to domestic  energy  and  raw  materials  prices  and  some
measure  of decentralization  in  price  setting  by enterprises.  The share  of
prices  that  can  be set  by market  forces  has grown  significantly  over the  1980s
but the  degree  of implicit  controls  on the  rate  of price  increase  has  remained
significant.
The  Hungarian  price  setting  system  in  the  1980's  has thus  been
characterized  by the  maintenance  of strong  centralized  mechanisms,  including
implicit  and  explicit  guidelines.  These  have  been  complemented  by loose
association  of domestic  tradables  prices  to  border  prices. Thus,  shocks  to12
the  price  level  have  come  primarily  from  discrete  changes  to controlled  prices
by the  planner. Such  shocks  have,in  turn,  been  a response,  commonly  lagged,
to  external  price  movements  as  well  as explicit  realignments  of relative
prices. While  the  commitment  of the  planner  to  price  stability  has  been
progressively  relaxed,  it is important  to  understand  that  a consistent
mechanism  for  dampening  price  growth  has  been to offset  input  cost  increases
by means  of direct  or indirect  subsidies  to enterprises.  The  financing
mechanism  has  either  been  through  the  budget  or,  more  commonly,  through  the
banking  system.
Table  3  shows  the  high level  of current  subsidies  attracted  by
enterprises.  A breakdown  of the  components  of the  total  subsidy  bill
indicates  that  nearly  16%  of total  current  subsidies  and financial  support  to
enterprises  between  1986-1988  took  the  form  of  producer  price  subsidies. Such
subsidy  covers  the  difference  between  actual  costs  and  administered  producer
prices  and, together  with similar  import  subsidie3,  amounted  to around  3%  of
GDP. 9 This in turn  engendered  a pattern  of  periodic  adjustment  to  producer
and  consumer  prices  as a  means  for  reducing  the  fiscal  costs  of that  gap.
Nevertheless,  subsidies  to  enterprises  and  consumers  appear  to  have  been a
major  element  in  a rising  fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  deficit  and  hence  a factor
in  sustaining  the  shifts  in  the  price  level  caused  by the  actions  of the
planner. Equally  significant  has  been  the  fact  that  gradualistic  price
reforms  and  a rising  share  of partially  controlled  and  market-based  prices
nave  not  been  associated  with  a sharp  price  spiral,  even  if inflation  has
remained  at  higher  levels  than  in the  1970s.
9  The  subsidy  is determined  independently  of the  general  profitability  of
the  producer  on the  basis  of the  discrepancy  between  the  administered  price
and  the  cost  of a given  commodity.13
Table  3:  Hungary
Prices  and  Subsidies,  1982-1989
-.-.--  of GDP-------------  Ratio Enterprise
Year  Consumer  Producer  General  Govt  Subsidies  to  Subsidy  to Gross
Prices  Prices  Subsidies  Enterprises  Operating  Surplus
1982  6.9  4.7  34.7  18.8  44.4
1983  7.3  5.5  36.4  19.5  46.7
1984  8.3  4.2  34.1  18.4  39.1
1985  7.0  5.3  35.1  20.0  39.0
1986  5.3  2.1  37.0  20.8  38.3
1987  8.6  3.5  34.7  20.8  37.0
1988  15.7  4.6  35.8  17.4  38.0
1989*  17.0  14.2  31.4  n.a.  n.a.
*-estimates
Source:  World  Bank
Table  4:  Poland
Distribution  of Prices  by Category,  1982-1990  (in  percent  of the  total  value
of  sales  for  the  products  covered  by each  category  of prices)
Administrative  Regulated  Contract
Prices  Prices  Prices
Prices  of consumer
goods  and  services
1982  35  15  50
1983  45  15  40
1984  47  3  50
1985  47  3  50
1986  46  2  52
1987  45  0  53
1988  45  0  55
1989  45  0  55
1990  5  0  95
Source: IMF14
Table  5:  Poland
a.  Consumer  subsidies  in  percent  of GDP  and  inflation.
Subsidies  CPI  Growth
In Percent  of GDP  Total  Controlled  Free
1980  27.8  9.4  --
1981  30.3  24.4  --  --
1982  17.2  101.5  110.7  89.5
1983  14.8  23.0  23.9  19.9
1984  15.8  15.7  14.9  15.5
1985  15.0  14.4  11.3  17.4
1986  15.6  18.0  14.6  19.6
1987  15.1  25.2  21.1  27.4
1988  14.9  60.0  58.4  60.9
1989  12.0  249.0  --  --
b.  Fiscal  deficit  and  seignorage.
Fiscal  deficit/GDP  DM1/GDP'°
1980  1.15  3.4
1981  10.43  7.1
1982  2.47  8.4
1983  0.82  2.5
1984  0.67  3.0
1985  0.21  4.3
1986  0.45  4.2
1987  1.70  4.6
1988  0.22  6.6
1989  7.50  13.5
Source: World  Bank
'0/  DMI-Ml-Ml(-l)15
The  Polish  experience  with  price  reform  in the  1980's  shares  many  of the
features  described  in  the  case  of Hungary.  As shown  in  Table  4, the  major
price  reform  of 1982  created  different  categories  of prices,  while  increasing
over  time  the  share  of those  prices  set,  at least  in  principle,  independently
of administrative  controls.
In general,  as in  Hungary,  price  controls  in Poland  have  been  maintained
through  a sizable  flow  of subsidies  to the  sectors  subject  to price  controls.
Table  5 reports  the  evolution  of  consumer  subsidies,  defined  as the  difference
between  production  costs  and  controlled  prices,  during  the  1980's.
Two  main  observations  can  be made.  First,  the  price  reform  of 1982,  by
both liberalizing  prices  for  a significant  share  of goods  and  by increasing
prices  of controlled  goods,  involved  a sharp  contraction  of subsidies,  from  a
level  which  was clearly  unsustainable.  In other  words,  the  price  reform  should
be interpreted  as a clear  attempt  at reducing  macroeconomic  imbalance  and
changing  relative  prices. Second,  there  is  no simple  short-run,  negative
correlation  between  the  overall  inflation  rate  and  the  subsidy  bill.  Rather,
one  can  infer  that  even  at  high rates  of average  inflation  a reduction  in
subsidies  will  not  necessarily  occur  if  controlled  prices  lag  behind  market
prices. Indeed,  it  appears  that  subsidies  have  been  negatively  correlated
with the  relative  price  of controlled  with respect  to market  prices.  This
occurs  because  market  prices  enter  into  the  production  costs  of sectors
subject  to  price  controls,  both directly  though  the  price  of inputs  or
indirectly  through  the  effect  on  wages.  Clearly,  in a system  in  which  wages
are  indexed  to a  basket  of goods  which  comprises  both  controlled  and
uncontrolled  goods,  an increase  in  market  prices  promotes  an increase  in  wages
thus  ratcheting  up wage  costs  for  enterprises,  including  for  those  subject  to16
price  controls.  Through  this  channel,  increases  in  market  prices,  relative  to
controlled  prices,  can  yield  expansion  in  the  level  of subsidies  and  hence  of
the  consolidated  fiscal  deficit. This  outcome  appears  at  various  times  to
have emerged  in  both  Hungarian  and  Polish  cases.
Despite  some  analogies  with the  Hungarian  experience,  however,  in Poland
there  seems  to  be a clear  correlation  between  price  reform  and  a rapidly
accelerating  inflation  rate.  The impulse  can  be variously  traced  to controlled
and  market  goods  prices. Thus,  adjustments  to controlled  prices  invariably
led  to episodes  of accelerating  inflation  as in 1982,  1988  and  1989.  But
between  1983  and  1988  the  pattern  was  reversed,  with  market  prices  growing
faster  than  controlled  prices.  In 1989  and in  January  1990,  administrative
prices  'led'  the  inflationary  process. Input  prices,  in  particular  energy,
were  subject  to the  most  significant  changes.  In three  rounds,  in  October  and
November  1989,  and in  January  1990,  prices  of  main  energy  products  were raised
sharply,  at rates  of between  500-600  percent  in  some  cases. This  contrasts
with  the  1982  price  reform  in  which  energy  and  input  prices  were subject  to
mild  correction.
The  different  inflationary  paths  followed  in  Hungary  and  Poland  during
sustained  periods  of price  reform  suggests  that  the  effects  of the  latter
depend  critically  on the  way in  which  they  are  enacted  and  on the
macroeconomic  context,  including  the  bargaining  process  for  wages  and  prices,
in  which  they  operate.
In  principle,  wages  were determined  in  both economies  in  reference  to a
centralized  wage  norm  with  some  further  adjustment  for  plant-level
productivity  growth. In  Hungary,  control  of  wage changes  through  progressive
taxes  was fairly  successful  until  recently. Wage  drift  over the  1980s  was17
relatively  slight. However,  the  underlying  rule  related  wages  to  planned  or
expected  inflation  and  was  to some  degree  independent  of the  productivity
relationship  meant  to  underpin  the  wage  contract. In the  Polish  case,  by
contrast,  the  ability  to  enforce  a centralized  norm  was  eroded. The  1982
reforms  aimed  to address  macroeconomic  imbalances  by imposing  a real  wage
reduction. By 1989  real  wages  had gradually  moved  back to  pre-1982  levels  and
centralized  norms  became  increasingly  irrelevant  in the  wage  determination.
Inflationary  pressure  on costs  was consequently  more  profound  than  in  Hungary.
With ex ante  indexation  of  wages  to  prices,  changes  to the  price  level  were
simply  validated. As the  planner  relied  on price  adjustments  as the  main
mechanism  for  correcting  macroeconomic  imbalances  this  generated  an underlying
instability  in the  system. The  high inflation  of 1989  can  be ascribed  to the
impact  of accelerated  domestic  price  liberalization  and  exchange  rate  policy
on costs  via the  indexation  scheme  and  through  the  cumulative  impact  on
expectations,  including  the  uncertainty  imparted  to the  system  by the  lack  of
apparent  rules  in the  determination  of  price  changes  by the  planner.
3. The  formal  model
We now  construct  a simple  macroeconomic  framework  which  explicitly
accounts  for  the  coexistence  of controlled  and  market  determined  prices.  The
model,  with the  help  of some illustrative  numerical  simulations,  aims  to
explore  more rigorously  some  of the  dynamics  associated  with the  mixed  price
economy  as  outlined  in  the  previous  section.
One  of the  main  problems  in analyzing  a mixed  price  system  is that  of
ascertaining  the  pricing  rules  followed  by the  planners  for  controlled  goods.
A natural  initial  assumption  would  be to  associate  the  motivations  underlying
price  changes  of controlled  goods  with those  prevailing  in  the  earlier  period18
when  all  prices  were set  administratively.  However,  to the  extent  that  this
would  assume  a fix-price  economy,  this  would  say  little  regarding  the
appropriate  rule  for  adjusting  controlled  prices. In that  respect,  it  clearly
requires  that  the  planner's  pricing  rule  be affected  by macroeconomic  policy
objectives,  such  as reducing  excess  demand  or the  deviations  of actual  from
planned  output  ".
In this  paper,  we explicitly  postulate  an adjustment  rule  for  controlled
prices  which  accounts  not  only  for  excess  demand  effects  but  also  accommodates
relative  controlled  and  market  price  considerations.  Specifically,  the  planner
is  assumed  to adopt  the  following  rule  for  price  adjustment:
PQ=r(Y-y*)+c(pf-p;)
The  first  term,  (Y-Y*),  captures  the  concern  with  macro-disequilibria  or
excess  demand  and the  second  term,  (P t-P 0),  the  concern  for  relative  prices.
The  latter  may  arise,  for  example,  because  of  budgetary  considerations,  or
with  free  prices  following  closely  world  prices  -- assuming  for  instance  that
free  prices  apply  to tradable  goods--  this  can  also  reflect  the  attempt  of
bringing  the  whole  price  system  closer  to  world  market  prices. Thus,  if free
prices  enter  as inputs  in  the  production  of controlled  goods,  relative  prices
will affect  the  profitability  of  enterprises  in the  controlled  sector.
To simplify  the  exposition  we analyze  two  polar  cases  in  which  the
planner  cares  either  about  excess  demand  or relative  prices. The  properties
of the  general  model  are  a linear  combination  of the  two  submodels. For
market  prices  we assume  the  same  setting  for  the  two  models.  Such  prices  are
t1  Charemza  and  Quandt  (1982)  introduce  price  dynamics  in  a standard
disequilibrium  model  with  the  assumption  that  the  planner  adjusts  prices  to
eliminate  macro-  disequilibria.  See  also  Peebles  (1986).19
characterized  by some  stickiness  at the  aggregate  level,  due to the  fact  that
prices  are  changed  only  at  certain  intervals.  The  price  setting  embodies  a
forward-looking  component,  related  both to  the  price  of competitors  and  to the
state  of the  market  for  the  period  in  which  the "price-tag"  will  be in  place.
Moreover,  the  timing  of price  changes  is  assumed  to  be staggered  over
individual  enterprises.  The  full  specification  of the  models  is  contained  in
the  Appendix.
3.1. The  planner  as 'leader'
Controlled  prices  move  over  time  according  to the  following  adjustment  rule:
t9g - r(Yt-Y)  12  )
where  Y is the  demand  determined  output,  and  Y'  potential  output,  assumed
constant.  We will  denote  the  deviation  of output  from  its  potential  level  as
D. Here  we assume  that  the  pl mer sets  controlled  prices  looking  at aggregate
imbalances  and  not  just  at disequilibria  in  the  controlled  sector. This
assumption  simplifies  the  analysis  and  seems  to reflect  the  actual  concern  of
planners  in socialist  economies  (Peebles  (1986),  Charemza  and  Quandt  (1982),
Quandt  (1989)).
For  market  prices  we assume  a framework  which  accounts  for  three  main
features:  a) firms  are  not  price  takers;  they  have some  monopoly  power  which
they  exploit  through  the  price  setting;  b) at the  aggregate  level,  prices  do
not  adjust  instantaneously  to equilibrium;  c) the  price  setting  is  not
12  A more  rigorous  model  would  add  a term  reflecting  the  long-run
inflation  rate to  equation  (1).  In the  present  specification,  indeed,  in the
long-run  controlled  prices  do not  change,  while  free  prices  increase  at the
constant  rate  of money  growth.  Since  our  concern  is  on the  dynamics  and  not  on
long-run  positions,  we use the  simpler  version  of  price  adjustment.
Considerations  of relative  prices  between  controlled  and free  goods  are
examined  in section  3.3..20
synchronized  across  individual  enterprises.  This  esynchronization  increases
the  inertia  in the  adjustment  of  market  prices.  In  order  to  emphasize  the
differences  between  the  price  setting  of market  prices  with respect  to the
price  setting  of controlled  prices,  we  will assume  a price  system  for  the
former  which  reflects  a fairly  developed  market  system. We assume  a
monopolistically  competitive  setting  with  price  setters  forming  rationally
expectations  on prices  of their  competitors  and  on future  states  of excess
demand  '3.  Consequently,  market  forces  play  a fundamental  role in  price
adjustment;  there  is  a sufficiently  high  degree  of competition  among  firms  and
actors  behave  rationally,  given  the  market  structure  in  which  they  operate.
The dynamics  of market  prices  are  represented  by the  following  equations:
Vi-6(V,-P-4D,)  (2)
describes  the  dynamics  of "new"  prices  V, set  at each  point  in time  by an
individual  firm,  while
Pte  (V- P)  (3)
describes  the  dynamics  of average  prices.
The  system  of equations  (1),  (2)  and (3)  describes  a two-track  economy,  with
the  controlled  sector  more  sluggish  than  the  market  sector.  Moreover,  the
planner  is "backward-looking"  and  takes  into  account  only  aggregate  variables
in the  price  adjustment  rule,  whereas  the  market  sector  is  forward  looking  and
comprises  an interaction  among  individual  price  setters,  through  their  concern
with  competitors'  prices.
13 The  price  setting  for  market  prices  is  based  on Calvo  (1983).21
Despite  its  simplicity,  the  model  captures  some  uf the  features  of
transitional  socialist  economies.  The  random  arrival  of  price  change  signals
is  consistent  where  the  government  pursues  uncertain  price  policies  within  its
implicit  constraint  of the  tolerability  of price  changes. The  role  of
relative  prices  is institutionally  imposed  by rules  which  state  that  prices  of
individual  products  cannot  deviate  too  much from  those  of similar  products.
To close  the  model  we need  to specify  the  deviation  of  output  from  its
potential  level,  D, and  the  monetary  sector.  We assume  aggregate  demand
depends  on real  monetary  balances  and  on the  real  rate  of interest.  Output  is
demand  determined,  and  Y  is  a constant  "natural",  or  non-inflationary,  level
of output.  t4
Dt-C  (K-  Pt)449(-t  -it)  (4)
where  XT is  the  inflation  rate;  a  weighted  average  of the  rate  of inflation  in
controlled  and  market  prices:
-t-aP,+(l-q)rt  with  O<a<l  (5)
We first  analyze  a  model  in  which  money  supply  is  exogenous  and its  rate  of
growth  constant  over  time.
3.2. Exogenous  Money  Supply
With an exogenous  rate  of growth  of  money  supply  we are  assuming  that
price  policies  are  subordinate  to  active  monetary  policy. The  price  policy
pursued  by the  planner  essentially  determines  the  speed  at  which  controlled
prices  adjust  to changed  monetary  conditions.  During  the  adjustment,  this
"  Real interest  rates  have  been found  irrelevant  in  empirical  analyses
of savings  functinns  for  classical  CPEs (see  Portes  and  Winter  1978). It is
plausible  to  assume  that  interest  rates  have  gained  relevance  in  affecting
consumer  behavior  in reforming  socialist  economies.22
price  policy  affects  the  extent  of  disequilibria  in  goods  market,  as it
affects  the  proportion  ,f  increase  in  the  money  stock  which  translates  into  an
increase  in  real  monetary  balances  and  thus,  aggregate  demand. As shown  in
the  Appendix,  when  money  supply  grows  at the  constant  rate  A,  there  are two
possible  dynamic  configurations:  the  first,  complete  instability  of the
system,  the  second,  a  unique  convergent  path.  15
The  unique  convergent  solution  arises  when
-ra6 264k<o,  or  E.O.
Recalling  the  definition  of  E  (see  Appendix),  we can  restate  the  condition
above  as
l-(l-a)rO>O,  or,  in  a more  convenient  form,
r19/(A-a)  (*
Condition  (*)  states  that  for  a given  value  of the  elasticity  of aggregate
demand  with respect  to  expected  inflation  (  the  parameter  e), the  speed  of
adjustment  of controlled  prices  has to  be sufficiently  slow  to  ensure  a  unique
convergent  path.'s
15  The  unique  convergent  path is  associated  with  a saddle-path  type
solution.  As is standard  in  the  rational  expectations  literature,  we will
concentrate  on the  latter  as the  stable  solution  of the  system.
18  Note that  the  above  condition  closely  resembles  both the  condition
for  stability  in  a standard  IS-LK  model  and  the  well-known  condition  for
stability  of the  inflationary  process  obtained  in  Cagan(1956),  in  a  purely
monetary  model,  with  backward-looking  expectations.  This is  hardly  surprising,
as our  model  shares  properties  of  both  models.  In the  short-run  it  behaves  as
a standard  IS-IM  type  of  model,  while  in  the  long-run  it  has  the  standard
characteristics  of a monetary  modal.  In the  context  of an IS-LM  model,  the
above  condition  guarantees  that  the  IS  curve  is downward  sloping,  and  that  an
exogenous  increase  in  demand  increases  output.  In  our  model,  output  is fixed
and  the  decision  on price  changes  of the  planner  is  exogenous.  Therefore,  a
lriori  we cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  of instability.  As shown  in  Tobin
(1975),  the  fact  that  increasing  flexibility  (the  speed  of adjustment  of
prices)  of  price  changes  can  be destabilizing  is a  pronerty  that  extends  to  a
range  of  model3. As in  Tobin,  we simply  show  the  conflicting  effects  of  price
level  changes  versus  expected  changes  in inflation  rates.  If the  latter  effect23
According  to the  condition  (*),  the  following  factors  stabilize  the  system:
(a)  a low  value  for (1-a).  Thus,  the  larger  is the  share  of free  prices  the
higher  is the  probability  of stability.
(b)  a low  value  of  r:  the  price  idjustment  in the  controlled  sector  should
not  be "too  fast".
(c)  a low  value  of e:  a low  elasticity  of aggregate  demand  with respect  to
the  real  interest  rate.
Points  (a)  and (c)  highlight  the  conflicting  impact  on the  dynamics  of the
system  of forward-looking  behavior  on the  part  of  price  setters  and  forward-
looking  behavior  on the  part  of consumers. The  larger  is the  share  of  market
prices,  and  forward-looking  price  setters,  the  more likely  is  the  system  to  be
stable. The intuition  behind  this  result  is  the  following.  Forward-looking
price-setters  reduce  the  "rigidity"  of the  system  and  the  inertial  movement  of
prices  and  hence  accelerate  the  tendency  toward  long-run  equilibrium.  By
contrast,  forward-looking  behavior  on the  part  of consumers  can  destabilize
the  system,  as inflationary  expectations  reinforce  tendencies  in  demand  and
prices. Specifically,  if demand  is increasing  and  there  is  upward  pressure  on
inflation,  the  expectation  of rising  inflation,  by reducing  the  real  interest
rate,  enhances  demand  and  thus  inflationary  pressures.
Despite  its  simplicity  the  model  gives  rise  to interesting  and  fairly
complicated  dynamic  configurations.  A first  inference  on the  stability
properties  of the  model  can  now  be drawn. In the  presence  of sticky  prices
and  different  speeds  of adjustment  in the  two  sectors,  a higher  flexibility  in
dominates,  the  system  can  demonstrate  instability.  Furthermore,  we could  have
specified  e  not  as a constant  but  as a function  --conceivably  an increasing
function--  of the  rate  of inflation;  this  would  have  caused  the  perverse
result  of lowering  the  value  of  r  compatible  with stability  in conditions  of
higher  inflation.24
setting  prices  in the  controlled  sector  can  destabilize  the  economy. The
relatively  sluggish  behavior  of controlled  prices  may  serve  as  an anchor  for
the  whole  system. A solution  to this  problem  would  obviously  be to change  the
price  setting  rule  in the  controlled  sector. If the  planner  adopts  a pricing
rule  analogous  to that  of the  market  6oods,  there  would  be no risk  of
instability,  even  with  a high  frequency  of price  adjustments  for  controlled
prices. Without  changing  the  existing  rule,  however,  an increased  flexibility
in the  controlled  sector  can  be destabilizing,  placing  the  system  on a
potentially  explosive  inflation  path.
We now turn  to  the  analysis  of the  unique  convergent  path  and to  the
dynamics  of inflation  following  policy  changes.  We will  concentrate  on  a very.
simple  policy  change,  namely  an  unanticipated  change  in  the  rate  of growth  of
money  supply.  The  dynamics  of the  system  is  depic'  3d  in  Figure  1.
The slope  of the  unique  convergent  path is  positive. The  increase  in the
rate  of growth  of  money  supply  yields  a shift  of the  steady-.state  inflation
rate  from  1  to  1i'.  It  also  induces  an upward  parallel  shift  of the  saddle-
path.  To determine  where  the  system  will settle  on impact  we know  from
equation  (6)  that (d7r/dD)-l/(O).  This is  the  slope  of the  CC line  in  Figure
1.  From  this  we can see  that  the  system  has to  be on line  CC and  on the  new
saddle  path  immediately  after  the  policy  change. Therefore,  the  system  will
be at the intersection  between  CC and  the  new  saddle  path (point  C in Figure
1) "1. It  is clear  that  there  is overshooting  on impact.  The inflation  rate
increases  initially  above  its  new  long  run  level. Aggregate  demand  declines
but  both inflation  and  aggregate  demand  move thereafter  towards  the  long-run
equilibrium.  From  Figure  1  we can  see that  the  magnitude  of the  overshooting
'  See  Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1989)  for  an  analogous  derivation.25
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and  of the  initial  output  decline  depends  on the  slope  of the  saddle-path  and
on the  slope  of the  line  CC.  In this  regard,  we can identify  the  main factors
determining  these  slopes  and  thus  the  magnitude  of the  overshooting.
(a)  The  higher  the  sensitivity  of aggregate  demand  with  respect  to the  real
interest  rate,  the  larger  is the  overshooting  (this  indeed  yields  a flatter  CC
line).
(b)  The larger  is the  relative  share  of  market  goods,  the  larger  is the
overshooting  (the  SS line  becomes  steeper;  see  S'S'  line  in  Figure  1).
(c)  Finally,  the  higher  is the  flexibility  of  price  adjustments  (higher  r
and/or  higher  6),  the  larger  is the  overshooting.
These  features  point  to the  difficulties  inherent  in  a price
liberalization  manoeuvre  in the  presence  of  exogenous  sources  of inflation,
such  as an increase  in the  rate  of growth  of money  supply. The  resulting
overshooting  of  prices  has  to  be set  against  the  fact  that  the  very  same
features  also  accelerate  the  adjustment  to the  steady  state.  The  economy  faces
a trade-off  between  a sharp,  short-lived  adjustment  versus  a more  moderate  and
more  protracted  adjustment.
We now  report  the  results  of a numerical  simulation  (see  appendix  for
details)  of the  effects  on the  inflation  rate  of different  shares  of market
prices  in the  total  price  index.
Figure  2 clearly  shows  the  different  response  of the  system  to  an
exogenous,  unanticipated,  increase  in the  rate  of growth  of money  supply. Two
cases  are  outlined,  one  which  is characterized  by a low  share  of market  priges
(low  alpha)  and  the  second  by a large  share  of  market  prices  (high  alpha)  in
total  prices. The  magnitude  of the  initial  overshooting,  and  the  time  span
necessary  to  complete  most  of the  adjustment  (a  complete  adjustment  is27
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asymptotic)  to the  new steady  state  differs  significantly  in the  two  cases.  It
can  be seen  that  an increase  in  the  share  of  market  prices  from  50 to 90
percent  yields  a significantly  larger  overshooting  on impact  (about  15 percent
of the  long-run  increase). It  can  also  be noted  that  the  inflation  rate
declines  faster  in  the  more liberalized  system  and  after  one  period  the
inflation  rate  of the  system  with  o-0.9  is  below  that  of the  system  where  50%
of  prices  are  market  based.  Excess  demand,  defined  as deviation  of output
from  its  noninflationary  level  is  much  larger  and  persistent  when  controlled
prices  account  for  50  percent  of tl..  price  index.  It is  also  worth  noting  that
in  this  setting  inflation  for  market  prices  is an increasing  function  of
inflation  for  controlled  prices.  This  results  because  the  relative  price  of
controlled  and  market  goods  has  no macroeconomic  impact  in  this  model.  This
property  will disappear  in  the  next two  specifications  of the  model.
Assuming  the  system  is  stable,  it is interesting  to  analyze  the  effect  on
the  path of inflation  of varying  the  speed  of adjustment  of controlled  prices.
The  rumerical  simulations  indicate  that  those  effects  crucially  depend  on the
sensitivity  of aggregate  demand  to expected  inflation.  Specifically,  when this
sensitivity  is  quantitatively  significant,  a faster  speed  of adjustment  of
controlled  prices  tends  to induce  a larger  overshooting  of the  rate  of
inflation  on impact.  This relation  is  however  reversed  for  low  values  of the
elasticity  of aggregate  demand  with  respect  to  expected  inflation.  As shown  in
Fig.3,  for  a value  of the  elasticity  below  a  critical  level  e,  a faster  speed
of adjustment  of controlled  prices  reduces  the  overshooting  in  the  overall
inflation  rate.
Thus,  the  more  relevant  are  expectations  of future  inflation  in  affecting  the
behavior  of consumers,  the  more "inflationary"  on impact  will  be an increase30
FIGURE  3
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in the  "activism"  of the  government  in  changing  controlled  prices.
In the  next  section  we modify  the  model  by assuming  that  the  process  of
money  creation  is endogenous  and,  in  particular,  linked  to  changes  in  the
relative  prices  of  controlled  and  market  goods.
3.3. Endogenous  Money  Supply
Disregarding  relative  prices  may  have  macroeconomic  effects  through  a
fiscal-monetary  channel  that  is  particularly  relevant  when  producers  may  be
seen  to face  a "soft  budget  constraint"  (Kornai,  1980). We noted  above  the
importance  of this  channel  particularly  in the  case  of Poland.  Assuming  that
market  goods  enter  as inputs  in the  production  of controlled  goods,  relative
prices  of controlled  and  market  prices  affect  the  profitability  of enterprises
in the  controlled  sector. Assuming  further  that  the  losses  of enterprises  in
the  controlled  sector  are fully  monetized  by the  central  bank,  we can  describe
the  process  of  money  creation  as follows:
t-r  (P'-P9)
The  stability  properties  of this  model  are  significantly  modified  (see
Appendix  for  a full  dynamic  analysis). The  two  possible  dynamic  regimes,
depending  on parameter  values,  are  still  a saddle  path  equilibrium  and  a fully
unstable  solution.  The  endogeneity  of money  creation  carries  a self-correcting
mechanism  into  the  inflationary  process.  The increase  in  money  supply  exerts
an  upward  pressure  on the  prices  of controlled  goods  - through  a demand  effect
- which  in  turn  improves  the  profitability  of enterprises  in  the  controlled,
sector  ond  thus  reduces  money  creation.  Consequently,  the  model  indicates  a
possible  stabilizing  effect  of changes  in  controlled  prices  when  the  spread
between  controlled  and  market  prices  translates  into  government  subsidies32
which  are  financed  through  money  creation.  The  speed  of adjustment  of
controlled  prices  has to  be sufficiently  fast  and,  moreover,  faster  than  that
of  market  prices  if the  latter  constitute  a large  share  of total  prices.
The  interesting  conclusion  arising  from  this  model  is that  a  mixed  system
with  a large  share  of controlled  goods  is  intrinsically  unstable  when the
adjustment  of  controlled  goods  is slower  than  that  of market  prices.  "One
shot"  adjustments  of controlled  prices  may  help temporarily  in reducing  the
subsidies  induced  by a gap  between  controlled  and  market  prices.  However,  over
time  inflationary  pressures  will  re-surface  I  .
This  process  highlights  the  fiscal  properties  of the  inflationary
pressures  associated  with a  mixed  price  system.  To achieve  a sustainable
reduction  of inflation  requires  either  a full-fledged  liberalization  of prices
or,  with  maintenance  of a dual  pricing  systems,  a fiscal  correction  on the
revenue  side  sufficient  to offset  the  subsidies  engendered  by the  discrepancy
between  controlled  and  market  prices.
From  a numerical  simulation  we also  obtained  that  the  adjustment  to  the
steady  state  is  generally  cyclical.  Accordingly,  the  relative  price  of
controlled  with  respect  to  market  goods  oscillates  during  the  adjustment,  with
controlled  prices  growing  faster  and  then  slower  than  market  prices  in  a
cycling  movement.  Interestingly,  this  type  of behavior  can  be noticed  for
Poland  during  the  1980's  (see  Chart  1).  The relation  between  controlled  prices
and  market  prices  varies  during  the  adjustment.  There  are  periods  in  which  an
increase  in  market  prices  leads  to  a decline  in  controlled  prices,  and  periods
in  which  the  opposite  holds (see  Figure  4).
`3 Although  we do  not  explicitly  incorporate  an indexation  rule in  the
model,  it is  obvious  that  when indexation  is  present  the  adjustment  of
controlled  prices  and  the  closing  of the  subsidy  gap  can  be rapidly  eroded.33
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The  numerical  simulations  yield  some  additional  results  relating  to the
stability  properties  of the  model. In contrast  to the  model  in  which  money
was exogenous  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  controlled  prices  has to  be larger
than  the  critical  value  determined  by the  share  of controlled  goods  in  total
prices  and  by the  elasticity  of aggregate  demand  with  respect  to expected
inflation. In addition,  the  speed  of adjustment  of  controlled  prices  has to
be larger  than  that  of market  prices,  when  the  share  of market  prices  is
larger  than  a critical  value. For  structural  parameters  '.dentical  to those  of
the  previous  model,  it follows  that  the  critical  value  for  the  share  of  market
prices  is  fairly  small. We found  that  when  the  share  of market  prices  was
larger  than  twenty  percent  of total  prices  the  model  was unstable,  even  when
the  speed  of adjustment  of controlled  prices  was ten  times  larger  than  that  of
market  pricesl
Evidently,  price  controls  in  a system  with  endogenous  money  can  act  as a
nominal  anchor  and the  greater  the  share  of controlled  prices  in  total  prices
the  more effective  can  this  role  be.  However,  this  is  at the  obvious  cost  of
higher  repressed  inflation.  Once  some  measure  of price  liberalization  is
countenanced  and  market  prices  are fed  back into  average  prices  by means  of
their  impact  on input  prices  or through  the  loop  back into  output  prices  via
some  indexation  rule in  the  economy,  the  impact  on the  fiscal  side  becomes
critical. This  indicates  some  intrinsic  difficulties  in controlling  inflation
in  a mixed  system  when  money  is  passive  and  price  controls  affect  the  size  of
the  fiscal  deficit  and  hence  of money  creation. In contrast  to the  model  with
exogenous  money,  a  partial  price  liberalization  can  not  only  lead  to  an
initial  overshooting  of the  long-run  rate  of inflation  but it can  push
inflation  onto  an explosive,  self-generating  path.35
On the  assumption  that  the  appropriate  offsetting  fiscal  measures  are
taken,  our  model  with  endogenous  money  helps  highlight  a fundamental  issua
facing  transitional  socialist  economies. Without  consistent  macroeconomic
policies,  a partial  liberalization  may  prove  excessively  inflationary  while
only  addressing  the  underlying  fiscal  imbalance  in the  very short  run.  In the
next  section,  we indicate  how the  planner  can  reestablish  a  unique  convergent
path  by abandoning  an  iccommodating  money  supply  policy  for  bridging  the  gap
between  controlled  and  market  prices,  opting  instead  for  a rule  aimed  at
closing  the  gap  in  relative  prices. Borrowing  the  definition  used  by Honohan
(1988),  we denote  this  as the  behavior  of  a 'follower'.  In situations  in  which
a rapid  liberalization  may induce  a sharp  acceleration  in the  short  run  of the
inflation  rate (for  reasons  discussed  in the  context  of the  first  model
presented  in  section  3.1.  and in  particular  when expectations  of future
inflation  play  a fundamental  role),  the  rule  discussed  in  the  next  section  may
be relevant  as an alternative  to  a full-fledged  price  liberalization.
3.3. The  planner  as 'follower'
In this  section  we modify  the  assumption  regarding  the  planner's  rule  for
price  adjustment.  Accordingly,  we assume  that  the  planner  adjusts  controlled
prices  in  order  to eliminate,  although  sluggishly,  deviations  of controlled
prices  from  market  prices  (for  instance  for  the  budgetary  reasons  discussed
above;  this  can  provide  a rationale  for  this  rule  also  when,  as it is  usually
the  case,  controlled  prices  relate  to different  products  than  market  prices).
The  price  adjustment  rule  for  controlled  prices  is as follows:
PC-T  ( Pf  _p0)
Market  goods  are  still  set  in a staggered  manner. In this  case,  however,36
demand  for  market  goods  also  depends  on the  relative  price  of market  with
respect  to controlled  prices. This  can  be rationalized  by assuming  that
relative  price  considerations  directly  affect  the  planner's  adjustment  rule  as
controlled  and  market  prices  are  substitutes.  Accordingly,  relative  price
considerations  also  enter  into  the  specification  of  demand  for  the  two  types
of goods. This setting  may  be particularly  relevant  in those  cases  where
controlled  and  market  prices  coexist  for  the  same  product. The  dynamics  of
market  goods  are  thus  represented  by the  following  dynamic  equations:
ir_  6 (Vlt,-  P'tt-  Ay"t)
pl-  6 (vIt -Pt)
Excess  demand  for  market  goods  (y9)  is  a function  of real  monetary  balances,
the  real  interest  rate  and  the  relative  price  of  market  and  controlled  goods:
yl-  (mt-Pt)-e(t-pt)-AWp-1,)
where  P is  the  average  price  level,  defined  as a  weighted  average  of  market
and  controlled  prices;
p_  ap'+  ( 1-a)  w
The  details  of the  dynamics  associated  with  this  model  are  reported  in the
AppXndix. The  main result  is  that  this  adjustment  mechanism  for  controlled
prices  rules  out  instability.
The  result  is  quite  intuitive,  as  market  prices  do  not show  any intrinsic
tendency  to instability.  If the  planner  follows  the  adjustment  of those
prices,  thus  cnasing  a rate  of inflation  converging  to an  equilibrium  level,
this  cannot  de -abilize  the  system.  However,  the  presence  of controlled  prices
following  market  prices  obviously  slows  down the  speed  of adjustment  to the37
long-run  equilibrium  which  would  prevail  in  a fully  liberalized  system  19.
4.  Concluding  remarks
The  liberalization  of prices  is  key  to the  reform  of socialist  economies.
One  polar  model  involves  convergence  of domestic  to international  prices
through  a 'big  bang'  stabilization  of the  Polish  variety. Aside  from
questions  regarding  the  efficacy  of such  an approach  in  curbing  inflation  and
providing  the  parameters  for  structural  change,  political  and  economic
arguments  for  a more  gradualistic  approach  to  price  reform  are  likely  to prova
powerful  in shaping  the  design  of other  countries  reform  programmes. In this
light,  the  Hungarian  experience  with  phased  price  liberalization  provides  a
possible  alternative  framework.
In this  paper  we started  from  the  assumption  that  no jump  from  an
administered  price  system  to  a  perfectly  flexible  one  could  occur. Among
other  consequences,  this  implies  the  introduction  of distinct  inertial
features  associated  with the  liberalization  of prices. This  may  arise  as  a
result  of an inability  of  price  setters  to  coordinate  their  price  fixing  rules
in  a decentralized  setting  (Dornbusch  and  Simonsen,  1977). This is
particularly  pertinent  for  an economy  in  which  the  underlying  behavioural
rules  are  being  changed  and  where  price  setters  have in  effect  to absorb  and
learn  those  new  rules. To the  extent  that  price  liberalization  is accompanied
by systematic  movement  to  decentralized  price  and  wage setting  rules,  the
emergence  of overlapping  wage  contracts  would  also  be expected  to introduce
inertia,  the  degree  of  which  would  depend  in  part  on the  type  of wage
'9  It is  also  worth  noting  that  despite  the  planner  behaving  like  a
'follower'  with respect  to  market  goods,  during  the  adjustment  controlled
prices  may rise  above  market  prices. When  this  occurs,  the  adjustment  becomes
oscillatory,  yielding  cycles  around  the  steady  state.38
indexation  arrangement  that  existed  (Fischer,  1977). Empirical  work
indicates,  for  example,  that  wage  indexation  has  been a feature  of  both
Huneary  and  Poland,  our  two  illustrative  cases  (Commander  and  Coricelli,
1990). Under  the  cost-plus  pricing  rules  characteristic  of these  economies,
introduction  of any  backward-looking  component  in  the  indexation  would  have
particularly  strong  inertia'l  consequences.  Moreover,  the  synchronization  in
price  fixing  particular  to  systems  where  prices  are  determined  by the  planner
would  be lost  once  pricing  is  decentralized  and  price  revisions  are  staggered.
This  highlights  the  point  that  making  the  adjustment  of controlled  prices
more flexible  can  generate  instability  and large  price  oscillations  if the
-:ules  followed  by the  planner  for  the  adjustment  remain  unchanged. We show
that  the  risk  of instability  being  imparted  to  the  system  depends  on  whether
the  planner's  adjustment  rule  targets  macroeconomic  imbalances  or the  relative
price  of controlled  and  market  goods. To the  extent  that  the  concern  is  with
the  latter  and  forward  looking  behaviour  characterizes  price  setters  but  not
consumers,  it is  shown  that  the  planner's  price  adjustment  rule  can  serve  as
an anchor  to  the  overall  inflation  rate,  when  money  creation  is  'passive'.
In  contrast,  an 'activist'  rule,  based  on the  use  of controlled  prices  for
cu.rtailing  excess  demand,  can  destabilize  the  system  even  when  monetary  policy
is  not  accommodating.  This  occurs  when the  revision  of controlled  prices  is
very fast  and is  linked  to  the  destabilizing  effects  imparted  by expectations.
In this  context,  price  controls  can  provide  an additional  anchor  that  can  be
combined  with a  monetary  anchor.
The int-oduction  of  a greater  inertial  component  in inflation  clearly
complicates  the  initial  stage  of price  reform  where  the  objective  is  to
establish  a new  price  level  with  a differenc  set  of relative  prices  that  can39
eliminate  macroeconomic  imbalances.  This is  because  inertia  translates
changes  in  price  levels  into  movements  of the  inflation  rate. By affecting
expectations  inflation  may induce  undesirable  effects  on  aggregate  demand,
that  problem  being  magnified  by changes  in the  financial  sector  that  make
aggregate  demand  more  sensitive  to interest  rates. At the  same  time,  it is
important  to appreciate  that  if the  planner's  price  adjustment  rule
incorporates  reiative  price  considerations,  the  fiscal  implications  may  be
critical  in determining  the  inflationary  path.  If controlled  prices  on either
input  or output  sides  call  forth  an associated  subsidy  financed  from  the
general  budget,  the  monetary  accommodation  that  could  result  would  validate
and  potentially  accelerate  the  inflation  rate.
The  model  presented  in  this  paper  indicates  some  of the  complex  dynamics
and  sources  of instability  associated  with the  liberalization  of prices. A
number  of features  of the  model  have strong  assumptions  that  in  future  work
might  usefully  be modified. These  include  dropping  the  monopolistic
competition  setting  for  the  market  sector  and  working  with  a more  constrained
competitive  framework. For  controlled  prices,  rules  associated  with the
optimization  of certain  objective  functions  of the  government,  including  a
fiscal  target,  might  be introduced.  In addition,  more  consideration  could  be
given  to the  micro-foundations  of pricing  rules,  incorporating  the  effect  of
rule  changes  and  learning  on the  part  of  price  setters  (Day  and  Eliasson,
1986). At an empirical  level  we plan,  as  data  becomes  available,  to estimate
econometrically  features  of the  model. Having  discretely  identified  the
factors  determining  price  movements  for  controlled  and  market  prices,
simultaneous  estimation  of the  system  could  pin  down  their  interactive  effects
in  the  generation  of the  overall  inflation  path.4n
APPENDIX
1. The price setting for market goods
Price changes for market goods are assumed to  be are not synchronized across
enterprises and are characterized  by a degree of stickiness as "price tags"
last for a certain interval.  This interval is random at the enterprise level,
but is constant at the macro-level on the assumption of an exponential
distribution for the  price change signals and a large number of enterprises
(Calvo 1983).
Vt-  6  t  (P.+Iy.)e6(ds  Al
Pt-  t  j  Vse46')ds  A2
where P is the average price level, V is the new price set at time t, and y-D-
S.  From the above, we note two main features.  First, (Al) entails a forward-
looking component, as new prices depend on the expected price of competitors
and on the state of the economy for the  period in which the price tag will be
in force (which  on average is 1/6). Second, despite the "flexibility"  of
individual  new prices V (which can be set at any value at time t and thus are
"jump"  variables), the price level P is a predetermined  variable at time t
(the integral in (3) is taken over past realizations of individual  prices).
The model thus combines inertial and forward-looking  elements, creating
interesting distinct, although intertwined,  dynamics of individual and
aggregate prices.
Differentiating (Al)  and (A2)  with respect to time we obtain (taking the
right-hand-side derivative for V, which is a forward-looking jump variable) we
obtain (2) and (3) in the text.
2.1.  Model 1
Money supply grows at the constant rate g
Mt-IeL  (A3)
and the interest rate is set equal to zero.
From the definition of the overall rate of inflation  we get
7rt-aPt+(1-a)P9,  (A4)
Using (1),  and noting from (2)  and (3) that
Pi-S(V)  -P)o-w-aDs  (A5)
(5)  now reads41
7re__O62F,Dt+  (1-a)rDt  (A6)
Differentiating  (4)  with respect  to time  we obtain
Di-CMe  904W-  c  +@r(9-70  +ewt  (A7)
Substituting  (A7)  into  (A6)  we obtain  the  final  expression  for  the  dynamics  of
the  inflation  rate:
7r_(1/E) (_a62M¢+(l-a)re  (A-iro)  (A8)
with  E-l-(l-a)r@.
Plugging  (A8)  into  (A7)  we obtain  the  final  expression  for  the  dynamics
of aggregate  demand:
Di_-  (e_e(l-a)/E)  (rt-_g) -(ea62/E)Dt  (A9)
Combining  equation  (A8)  and (A9)  we obtain  the  dynamic  system  in (Dt,,Kt).  In
matrix  form:
|  rt  - I)re/E  (1-cre/E
Dt  -E/E  e6B  /  Dt  l+eN(1-a)/E
In the  steady  state,  D;-&XO  and,  thus  irt-r  and  De--O  (Y-Y).
The  dynamic  properties  of the  system  can  be ascertained  from  the  sign  of the
Trace  and  the  Determinant  of the  transition  matrix  (recalling  that  the  Trace
equals  the  sum  while  the  Determinant  the  product  of the  characteristic  roots
of the  system):
Trace-  (-l/Z)((l-a)re+ec62B)  and
Determinant- _(l/E)6a6 2 &.
As all  original  parameters  were assumed  positive,  the  sign  of the  above
expressions  depends  on the  sign  of  E. Note  that  the  system  is  never  fully
stable:  the  existence  of two  negative  roots  implies  that  Det>O,  which  in turn
implies  E<O and  thus  Trace>O,  which  contradicts  the  assumption  of two  negative
roots.  The  two  possible  dynamic  configurations  are the  complete  instability  of
the  system  and  the  saddle-path  instability,  which  implies  the  presence  of  a
unique  convergent  path.  A necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  a saddle-
path  solution  is  that  Det<O  (so  the  two  roots  have  oppos!te  sign).  We can  then
establish  that  the  unique  convergent  solution  arises  when42
_Ca62&/E<O'  or  Z>O.
Recalling  the  value  of  E, we can  restate  the  condition  above  as
l-(l-a)r9>O,  or,  in a  more  convenient  form,
which  is the  condition  stated  in the  text.  If  condition  (*)  is  not  satisfied
the  system  is  unstable,  as  both  roots  of the  system  have  positive  real  values.
2.2  Endogenous  Money  Supply
In this  section  we establish  the  results  of the  dynamic  properties  of the
model  in  which:
M'-T  (PI  -Po)  (AlO)
The  analysis  of the  model  is  simplified  by applying  the  following
transformation  of  variables,  which  permits  reduction  in the  number  of dynamic
equations  to three:
Z-V-P',  m-M-P  and  pd_pg9pf.
The  homogeneous  part  of the  system  associated  with the  above  variables  is:
Z  (af2  -2  Ee/  ;  0
m  - -a6/E  ;  -(l-a)re/E  ;  -r
pd  /s(r-l)/;  reE  ;  0
We can  again  ascertain  the  dynamic  properties  of the  system  by analyzing  the
trace  and  the  determinant  of the  transition  matrix,  which  we call  A. Since  the
system  comprises  two  predetermined  variables,  m and  pd,  and  one  jump  variable,
Z,  the  saddle  path  solution  requires  one  root  with  a  positive  real  part  and
two  with  negative  real  parts.  Therefore  a necessary  condition  for  a saddle
path  solution  is that  Det(A)>O.
Trace(A)-  _aSx2/,_  (l-a)re/E
Det(A)-  r2(2e(l)r-)-6f/
A necessary  condition  for  a saddle  path  solution  is  that  Z<O. Interestingly,
the  condition  for  a saddle  path solution  is completely  reversed  with respect
to the  model  of  exogenous  money  considered  before.  E<O implies
r>l/(l-a)e.
Thus  the  speed  of adjustment  of controlled  prices  has to  be fast  enough  in
order  to  obtain  a saddle  path  solution.  However,  the  above  condition  is  not43
sufficient  for  a unique  convergent  solution.  Indeed,  additonal  restrictions  on
parameter  values  have to  be imposed.  Namely,  the  relative  speed  of adjustment
of controlled  prices  (the  parameter  r) with  respect  to the  adjustment  of free
prices  (the  parameter  6)  becomes  crucial.  If the  speed  of adjustment  of
controlled  prices  is  slower  than  that  of free  prices,  then  the  saddle  path
solution  requires  a small  value  for  the  share  of free  prices  in the  total
basket  of goods.  Alternatively,  if  the  speed  of adjustment  of controlled
prices  is  faster  than  that  of market  prices,  then  the  saddle  path  solution
arises  even  when the  share  of market  prices  approaches  unity.  Interestingly,
from  the  numerical  simulation  we obtained  that  when the  saddle  path  solution
arises  the  adjustment  to the  steady  state  is  cyclical,  as the  roots  with
negative  real  parts  are  two  complex  conjugates.
3.  Dynamics  of  Model  2
Using  the  definition  of  average  prices,  the  equation  for  new  prices,  V,
becomes:
Combining  this  equation  with that  for  average  market  and  controlled  prices  we
obtain  the  following  homogeneous  part  of the  dynamic  system  in  matrix  form
(g  .7  T  0 
pf  -0  -
V  s-6a(u-ear-ea);  -6(l-Be(l-c)-Bu+aEeT-B8(l-a)6);  6(l-1@(l-A)6)
Denoting  by A the  transition  metrix,  the  following  holds:
Trace  A- _r_6 2 2e(l_a)  <0
Det  A - T6 2Be  >0.
This  configuration  of signs  implies  that  two  roots  have  negative  real  parts
and  one  a positive  real  part,  which  is indeed  the  necessary  and  sufficient
condition  for the  existence  of a saddle  path  solution.
4. Numericai  simulation
The  following  values  were  used  for  the  structural  parameters  in  the
simulations:  B-1,  e-0.9. The rate  of growth  of money  supply  is  assumed  to
increase  permanently  by 100  percent. In the  simulation  of model  3.1.  6-0.4
r-0.1  and  e-l. In  model  3.2.  several  combinations  of s,  r  and  e  were  tried.
Under  stability  conditions  there  were  consistently  2 complex  conjugates,
implying  a cyclical  adjustment.  For  a>0.2,  the  system  was  unstable  even  for
r-25  and  6-0.4  (note  that  average  "quotation"  length  of free  prices  is (1/6),
thus  for  6-0.4,  average  quotation  length  is 2.5  periods. Controlled  prices
have  a speed  of adjustment  10 times  as large  as that  of  market  prices.44
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